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AUDIT REPORT LAG: DO COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FACTORS MATTER? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LEBANESE
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Abstract
The objective of this study is to investigate the determinants (company specific characteristics and
corporate governance factors) of audit report lag (ARL) in a developing country, namely, Lebanon. This
paper adds and contributes to the limited literature that investigated the determinants of ARL in the
developing Middle East countries through focusing on the Lebanese context. The study is carried out
depending on a sample of Lebanese commercial banks operating in Lebanon, covering the period from
2012 to 2017. The researchers used the multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of the
explanatory variables on ARL. The results show a significant relationship between ARL and each of bank
size, leverage, board independence, board diligence, audit committee (AC) independence, and AC diligence.
The regression outcomes reveal that banks with longer ARL are smaller, have higher leverage, their boards
and ACs are less diligence, their boards are more independent, and their ACs include less independent and
non-executive members.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The usefulness of accounting data to the different users of financial reports relies on the
timeliness of these data (Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Timeliness is one of the main qualitative features
of financial reporting that supports the decision making of the users (IASB, 2018), delayed accounting
data is of little use to the different investment decisions taken by the investors (Hassan, 2016). Indeed,
among the most significant elements that influence the timeliness of information release is the
timeliness of the external audit reports (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Leventis et al., 2005; Afify, 2009;
Abernathy et al., 2017). The fact that delay in performing the audit procedures and processes postpone
the release of the audited ﬁnancial reports, companies may be exposed to bad situations such as
negative and unexpected market responses and increase in information asymmetry due to ARL
(Abbott et al., 2012). Therefore, decreasing the external audit lag is considered essential to increase
the timeliness of financial reporting and to promote the trust of stockholders in capital markets
(Ettredge et al., 2006). In fact, the auditing literature has realized the significance and necessity of
conducting researches that focus on external audit lag due to its impact on the timeliness of financial
and audit data disclosure (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Pizzini et al., 2015; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a).
ARL (named also as audit delay), is measured in literature by the number of days from the end of a
firm’s fiscal year till the date of signing the audit report, which is the time needed to finish the audit
mission (Ashton et al., 1987; Hussin & Bamahros, 2013; Pazzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Oussii
& Taktak, 2018a).
Timely financial reporting in developing markets is so critical, because data in those markets
are finite and take long time to be published (Afify, 2009). Since timely financial data can support
decision-makers and decrease information asymmetry in those capital markets, scouting the
determinants of ARL in Lebanon, which is one of the developing markets, is essential. The goal of
this study is to examine whether the company specific characteristics (company size, financial
performance and financial condition) and corporate governance factors (Frequency of board
meetings, board size, board independence, AC size, AC independence, and frequency of AC
meetings) influence ARL. This paper contributes to the limited literature that investigated the
determinants of ARL in the developing Middle East countries. Especially that this finite literature
reveals contradict results regarding the direction and significance effect of each of these determinants
on ARL. This can be due to the variations in each of the regulatory and institutional situations,
measures of explanatory and dependent variables, and the number of years and observations that each
study covers. In this concern, Durand (2019) found in her meta-analysis study of the determinants of
ARL that the relationships between each of corporate governance factors (concerning the boards and
their ACs) and ARL are still unobvious; thus, the author suggested further research to be conducted
to clarify and explain these associations. Due to this inconsistency in literature findings, the
researchers consider that investigating the associations between ARL and each of the company
characteristics and corporate governance elements in the Lebanese context may provide additional
clarification and explanation for these associations. The study is conducted on 130 annual reports
related to 24 Lebanese commercial banks operating in Lebanon, covering the years from 2012 to
2017. The results reveal that the ARL for the sample banks ranges from 51 to 273 days, with an
average 122 days, for the six-year period (2012-2017). Regarding the company specific factors, the
multiple regression analysis reflects that both bank size and leverage have significant influence on
ARL but in opposite directions, the bank size affects ARL negatively but leverage influences the audit
lag positively. Concerning the third company characteristic, it is found that bank’s profitability has
insignificant impact on audit delay. In addition, the outcomes show that three corporate governance
factors (frequency of board meetings, AC independence, and frequency of AC meetings) have
negative significant influence on ARL; however, one corporate governance factor (board
independence) affects audit delay positively and significantly. Regarding the control variable, the
findings document that ownership concentration has positive significant influence on external audit
delay.
The rest of this study is arranged as follows: The second section presents brief background
about timeliness of financial reporting and ARL in USA, Europe, and Lebanon; besides, this section
displays a set of Lebanese laws and circulars issued for boosting the corporate governance
mechanisms in the banking sector. The third section presents the literature review and develops the
study’s hypotheses. The fourth section displays the research methodology, while the fifth section

demonstrates the regression analysis results. Finally, the sixth section illustrates the conclusion of the
study, comprising the limitations and suggestions for further future research.

2. BACKGROUND
The audit washout in the early periods of 2000s increased the doubt in the quality and timeliness
of financial data, which resulted in the issuance of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) act 2002 in USA
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Eulerich et al., 2017). Sections 404 and 409 of SOX act (2002) recommend
external auditors to accomplish more efforts in less time (Ettredge et al., 2006; Bronson et al., 2011;
Pizzini et al., 2015). After the publishing of section 409, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) gradually shortened the deadlines for submitting the 10- K reports, which comprise the audited
financial statements and the external audit report, of the accelerated filers 30 days (from 90 to 60
days) covering a three-year period. The goal of this action was to increase the timeliness of financial
data (Pizzini et al., 2015). Similarly, in Europe there was an increasing interest in improving the
timeliness of data dissemination. In this concern, the European Union mentioned: “The disclosure of
accurate, comprehensive and timely information about security issuers builds sustained investor
conﬁdence and allows an informed assessment of their business performance and assets. This
enhances both investor protection and market efﬁciency” (EU, 2004, Para. 1).
Consistent with the international callings to achieve more timely financial data through
accelerating the release of the external audit report and the audited financial statements, the Lebanese
central bank (Banque du Liban) since 1982 was interested in enhancing the timeliness of financial
statements of the banking sector. The Basic Circular No 7 published by the Lebanese central bank in
1982 requires from the banks operating in Lebanon to submit their external audit reports before
September 30 of each year (BDL, 1982). Moreover, the Basic Circular No 122 and the Intermediate
Circular No 447, published by the central bank, recommend the external auditors of these banks to
follow the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), comprising ISA 700-701-705-706-720, while
accomplishing their audit and preparing the audit reports (BDL, 2009; BDL, 2017).
The Lebanese central bank focuses also on promoting the corporate governance mechanisms
in the banking sector through issuing several circulars. For example, the Basic Circular No 106 (BDL,
2006) and the Intermediate Circular No 255 (BDL, 2011a) require from the banks functioning in
Lebanon to follow the rules released by the International Basel Committee and to formulate their own
“Corporate Governance Guide” that should state the procedures that must be followed by the banks’
departments to execute the rules of corporate governance. The guide of each bank should also specify
the board’s responsibility, size and synthesis (number of non-executive, independent, and executive
directors). Furthermore, these two circulars recommend the bank’s internal audit function to check
whether all the departments follow the corporate governance regulations and principles (BDL, 2006;
BDL, 2011a). In this concern and for the purpose of enhancing the efficacy and efficiency of the
banks’ boards, the Basic Circular No 118 and the Intermediate Circular No 253 recommend the
Lebanese banks to elect boards that include sufficient number of nonexecutive and independent
directors and to establish ACs independent from management with minimum size of three members.
Those two circulars also require from the banks’ boards and ACs to conduct frequent and periodic
meetings during the year in order to discuss the different regular and urgent cases (BDL, 2008; BDL,
2011b).
The Lebanese banking sector was one of the distinguished banking sectors worldwide due to
its high liquidity and cohesive solvency; besides, it was protected against the several local and foreign
jolts. The stability of the Lebanese banks in the various global economic jolts made the sector gain
wide reputation during the global financial crisis in 2008 (Alrub et al., 2018).

3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The literature revealed several company specific characteristics and corporate governance
factors that may influence ARL. The most company characteristics that were addressed in research
(for instance, Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006; Pizzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Abernathy et al.,
2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019) as determinants of ARL are company size, industry,
and company’s financial performance and financial condition (proxied by profitability and leverage).
Besides, the most corporate governance factors that were addressed in prior studies (for example,
Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; Baatwah et al., 2019; Habib

et al., 2019) as determinants of ARL are board characteristics (board’s size, independence, and
diligence) and AC characteristics (AC’s size, independence, and diligence).

3.1 Company Specific Determinants
The company specific determinants of ARL that this study focuses on are company size
and the two proxies of financial performance and condition (profitability and leverage). The
current study emphasizes on these characteristics because, as stated before, they were addressed
in literature (for example, Abernathy et al., 2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019) as the
most common determinants of ARL that are related to company characteristics. The next context
illustrates those determinants as documented in literature.

3.1.1 Company size
The studies that examined the association between the size of the company and
ARL (e.g. Davies & Whittred, 1980; Ashton et al., 1987, Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006;
Abbott et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a;
Durand, 2019) provided evidence that the two variables are significantly related. However,
there is no agreement in literature concerning the direction of this association.
Although Pizzini et al. (2015) and Oussii and Taktak (2018a) found that ARL is
positively associated with the company size, the majority of empirical research (e.g.
Ashton et al., 1987; Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Ettredge et al., 2006; Afify, 2009; AlGhanem & Hegazy, 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019)
argued that there is a negative association between the two factors. According to the
second point of view, larger firms are able to finish auditing their ﬁnancial statements
earlier than smaller firms for various reasons. First, big firms are more capable to possess
stronger internal control system, which would diminish the likelihood of having errors in
the ﬁnancial reports and encourages the external auditor to rely more on those controls;
hence, the ARL would decrease (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Abbott et al., 2012). Second,
large companies are more probable to have sufficient resources ready to be used for paying
high audit fees to accelerate the issuance of the audit opinion (Afify, 2009). Third, since
large firms are more monitored by regulatory agencies, trade unions, and investors, they
face high external pressure to shorten the time of issuing the annual financial reports
(Davies & Whittred, 1980). Finally, big companies are more likely to possess modern
accounting softwares and have formal policies and procedures that would lead to timely
audit completion (Afify, 2009). Based on the arguments of these studies, the first research
hypothesis is as follows:
H 1: There is a negative relationship between company size and ARL.

3.1.2 Financial performance and financial condition
Profitability had been examined in literature as a determinant of ARL that reflects the
performance of the company. Net income was used in some of these studies (for example,
Courtis, 1976; Durand, 2019) as indicator of performance; while, return on assets (ROA) was
used in other papers (e.g. Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a
& b) as a proxy for performance that reflects the company’s profitability strength. Those studies
consistently argued that profitability is negatively associated with ARL and found that bad
performers publish less timely financial reports. Firms with high proﬁtability are more probable
to finish auditing their statements earlier in order to faster the publishing of their audited annual
reports and transmit the “good news” to the stakeholders (Carslaw & Kaplan; 1991; Khoufi &
Khoufi, 2018). Moreover, companies that report income less than anticipated may devote extra
time to verify the reported outcomes or look for unregistered income items, which would delay
the issuance of the audit report (Afify, 2009). Building on these arguments the researchers
hypothesized that:
H 2a: There is a negative relationship between profitability and ARL.

Leverage is another proxy for performance and financial condition that was addressed
in the studies that examined the external audit lag (for example, Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991;
Bamber et al., 1993; Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Durand, 2019). These papers
argued that external auditors might be more cautious when auditing firms with high debts,
which would increase the ARL. Companies with high leverage may face additional financial
problems that may push their managers to manipulate the accounting numbers and release to
stockholders optimistic information. In this case, the external auditor would increase the audit
efforts to decrease the additional audit risk generated from the poor financial condition, which
in turn would increase the ARL (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Samaha & Khlif, 2017). Based on
these interpretations the researchers hypothesized that:
H 2b: There is a positive relationship between leverage and ARL.

3.2 Corporate Governance Determinants
In addition to the company specific characteristics, the literature (for example, Wu et al.,
2008; Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2016) mentioned several elements of corporate
governance that may have impact on ARL. The sturdiness of the corporate governance
mechanisms of the company can influence the external auditors’ control risk assessment and the
extent of their audit tests, which would influence ARL (Durand, 2019). The two groups of
corporate governance factors that this study focuses on are board characteristics and AC
characteristics. The current study emphasizes on those two groups because, as mentioned before,
they were addressed in literature as the most common determinants of ARL that are related to
corporate governance factors. Thus, the following context illustrates the influence of these
characteristics on ARL according to the previous studies.

3.2.1 Board characteristics
The ability of the board to reduce ARL depends on its attributes, which are size,
independence, and diligence (indicated by the recurrence of board meetings).

3.2.1.1 Board size
From a long time, a continuous debate among accounting and auditing
researchers had occurred regarding whether small or large boards are more
efficacious in oversighting and monitoring the managers and in enhancing the
quality and timeliness of financial statements. On one hand, it was claimed that
large boards are more efficacious in performing their tasks due to the multilateral
experience that their members may possess and are more able to decrease the
dominance of management (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). In addition, large boards with
diversity of members may have more desire to publish timely corporate information
on the firm’s website to entice new stockholders and satisfy the needs of different
stakeholders (Ezat & El-Masry, 2008). On the other hand, according to the agency
theory there should be a supreme limit to the number of directors to have an
effective board (Hassan, 2016). Consistent with the argument of this theory, Jensen
(1993) reported that if the board size is more than eight members, then the board
would be ineffective in performing his duties. The large board may impede the
ability to exchange ideas and reach an agreement among the members in the various
decisions (Dalton et al., 1999; Mak & Li, 2001; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005).
Furthermore, large boards may create problems in coordination and
communication, thus their monitoring efficiency and effectiveness would decline
(Wu et al., 2008; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). Since timely release of annual
reports requires effective monitoring and more coordination between the board
members, large boards may increase the lag of publishing the annual reports (Wu
et al., 2008).
Due to these arguments, there are opposite points of view in literature
concerning the relationship between board size and ARL. Although Samaha and
Khlif (2017) posited that board size affects ARL negatively, Hassan (2016) and
Habib et al. (2019) suggested the opposite. However, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010)

hypothesized significant association between the two variables without specifying
the sign of this association. The authors of these studies supported their suggestions
through referring to prior literature. For instance, Habib et al. (2019) debated that a
large board is usually less efficacious in monitoring the various managerial tasks,
including the tasks associated with financial reporting; besides it impedes the ability
of its members to coordinate and communicate with each other, which would
increase the ARL. In contrast, Samaha and Khlif (2017) argued that a large board
may decrease ARL because it is more probable to include the required expertise.
These contradicting results impede the researchers’ ability to expect the sign of the
relationship between board size and ARL; thus, the researchers hypothesized that:
H 3a: There is a significant relationship between board size and ARL.

3.2.1.2 Board independence
Board independence stands for the proportion of insiders versus outsiders.
The presence of independent members in the board may have a vital influence on
the monitoring role of the board to decline the likelihood of managers’ opportunistic
attitude (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to support the financial reporting process
(Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Consequently, if the governance structure of a firm
implements effective monitoring procedures and follows a vigorous strategic
perspective, there is high likelihood to achieve both more efﬁcient (fewer tests of
details) and effective external audit (Cohen et al., 2002). The literature (for
example, Afify, 2009; Chan et al., 2016; Samaha & Khlif, 2017) suggested a
negative relationship between the independence of the board and audit delay. In this
concern, Gilson (1990) documented that an independent board may require high
audit quality to secure its reputation, and since timely audit reporting is an indicator
of high audit quality (Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018), the independent board is more likely
to require timely audit reports. Consistently, Chan et al. (2016) documented that the
independency of the board enhances its oversight duty and assures more timely
publishing of the audited financial statements and audit report. Based on these
arguments the researchers hypothesized that:
H 3b: There is a negative relationship between board independence and ARL.

3.2.1.3 Board diligence
Diligence is another board characteristic that was examined in literature as a
determinant of ARL, proxied by the recurrence of board meetings. The frequent
board meetings improve the performance of the members and enable them to
accomplish their tasks properly (Conger et al., 1998), which would enhance the
internal control system of the firm. In this case, the strong internal control system
would encourage the external auditor to increase his reliance on the client’s internal
controls to reduce his work; thus, the ARL would decline (Hashim & Abdul
Rahman, 2010). In this concern, Tauringana et al. (2008) revealed that the
recurrence of board meetings has positive and significant impact on the timeliness
of the annual reports. In the same vein, Hashim and Abdul Rahman (2010) showed
that firms that hold frequent board meetings had more effective corporate
governance mechanism, which was reflected by increase in their performance and
earlier publishing of their external audit reports. Consistently, Chan et al. (2016)
and Habib et al. (2019) reported that boards that conduct more frequent meetings
have better overseeing of the ﬁnancial reporting process and are more interested in
achieving timely disclosure of financial reports, which would decrease the ARL.
Building on these arguments the researchers formulated the following hypothesis:
H 3c: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of board meetings and
ARL.

3.2.2 Audit committee characteristics
The literature revealed that ACs can have a vital role in reducing audit lag (e.g.
Afify, 2009; Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Pizzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016; Baatwah
et al., 2019). However, the effectiveness of the ACs in accomplishing this role depends on
their features, such as size, independence, and diligence.

3.2.2.1 Audit committee size
The AC cannot perform its duties effectively unless it includes a sufficient
number of members (DeZoort et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2005). Since
publishing more timely financial reports is one of the duties of the ACs, it is
expected that larger ACs decrease ARL. The different points of view in a large
AC would lead to better assessment of the work accomplished by the external
auditors (DeZoort et al., 2002). Furthermore, the variety of skills that the large AC
may possess would increase its ability to solve conflicts related to the audit report
(DeZoort et al., 2003). In this concern, some studies (for instance, Mohamad-Nor
et al., 2010; Nelson & Shukeri, 2011; Durand, 2019) found that firms with larger
ACs have shorter ARL. Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) documented that larger ACs
are more probable to spend additional time and exert more effort to release timely
financial reports to the users. Relatedly, Nelson and Shukeri (2011) argued that a
larger AC has more willingness to increase the strength of the company’s internal
control system, which would affect positivity the auditor’s evaluation of the
company’s business and audit risk and decrease the audit procedures and
substantive tests accomplished by the external auditor; thus the ARL would
decline. Based on these arguments the study hypothesized that:
H 4a: There is a negative relationship between AC size and ARL.

3.2.2.2 Audit committee independence
Independence is another proxy for AC effectiveness. If the members of the
AC are not independent from managers, they cannot accomplish their tasks well
(Davidson et al., 2005; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b). The Blue Ribbon Committee
Report (1999) documented that ACs should only consist of non-executive or
independent members, or else they would not be able to act effectively. The
presence of independent AC increases the likelihood to achieve financial
statements with high quality (Davidson et al., 2005) and decrease the probability
of having a qualified audit opinion (Pucheta-Martinez & De Fuentes, 2007). In
this concern, Krishnan (2005) found that the likelihood to have problems in the
internal controls over financial reporting is less in the existence of independent
AC; in this case, the external auditor would decrease the planned audit hours and
perform less audit procedures. Relatedly, both Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) and
Oussii and Taktak (2018b) posited that AC independence and audit lag are
negatively related. Based on these arguments the researchers formulated the
following hypothesis:
H 4b: There is a negative relationship between AC independence and ARL.

3.2.2.3 Audit committee diligence
The effectiveness of the AC is influenced by the number of meetings it
holds per year (Davidson et al., 2005). During the AC meetings, the problems
related to financial reporting process may be discovered. However, if the number
of the meetings is not sufficient, the troubles could not be detected and might not
be solved in a short time, which in turn, would reduce the quality of corporate
reporting (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). In this concern, Abbott et al. (2003) argued
that by conducting frequent meetings, the AC would be regularly informed about
the various accounting and auditing matters and would be more able to drive the
external audit resources to achieve more timely financial disclosure. In the same

vein, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) reported that the more the AC conducts frequent
meetings, the more likelihood it can resolve financial problems and lead the
external auditor to prepare timely audit report. Consistently, Samaha and Khlif
(2017) found that AC activity, reflected by the frequent meetings, improves the
quality of corporate reporting through decreasing ARL and enhancing the
timeliness of corporate disclosure. Building on these arguments the researchers
hypothesized that:
H 4c: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of AC meetings and
ARL.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to test the validity of this research’s hypotheses, an empirical study is conducted
depending on the data collected from the annual reports of the Lebanese commercial banks, covering
the period from 2012-2017. This section is devoted for presenting the population and sample of the
study, the method of collecting data, the formulated research model, and finally the measurement of
the various variables of the research model.
Table 1:The Final Sample Selection Criteria and the Number of Observations
Total Number
Lebanese Commercial Banks

35

(-) Banks that do not publish the annual reports or publish reports with missing data

(11)

Final Sample

24

Total expected annual reports for the period (2012-2017) (24 x6)

144

(-) Missing annual reports for certain years.

(14)

Final number of bank-year observations

130

Source: Developed by the Researchers

4.1 Population and Sample
This study focuses on the Lebanese banking sector because it was the most flourishing
sector in Lebanon, especially the commercial banks (Alrub et al., 2018). In Lebanon, there are
62 active banks, including 8 Arab and foreign banks and 54 Lebanese banks. The 54 Lebanese
banks are composed of 19 noncommercial and subsidiaries of commercial banks and 35
commercial banks (BDL, 2019). The population of this study is the 35 Lebanese commercial
banks operating in Lebanon. From these 35 banks,
11 banks are removed from the sample because either they do not publish their annual
reports or publish reports with missing data and those data are not found in their websites, thus
the final sample is 24 commercial banks. Some of these 24 banks did not publish the annual
report for certain years, which led to decrease the number of total observations from 144 (24 x
6) to 130 bank-year observations over the period 2012-2017. Table 1 displays the basis for
selecting the final sample and the number of observations.

4.2 Data Collection
The main source of data that this study depends on is the annual reports of 24 Lebanese
commercial banks operating in Lebanon, over the period 2012-2017. In addition, the researchers
used the websites of some of these banks to get any missing information in the annual reports.
The researchers intend to cover a long term interval period to provide more valid results. The
study considers the six years, from 2012 till 2017, because they are the most recent years that
the researchers could collect data about. Up to the date of preparing this research, the last annual
reports presented in the websites of the sample banks are related to the year 2017.

4.3 Research Model and Measurement of Variables
The model of the current study is presented in Fig. 1. The researchers proposed this model
to examine the effect of the company specific characteristics (company size, profitability, and
leverage) and corporate governance factors (board characteristics and AC characteristics) on
ARL.
A multiple regression analysis is conducted to test the hypotheses of this study and to
investigate the individual impact of each of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable.
The regression equation is formulated as:
ARL =α+β1 SIZE +β2 PROF +β3 LEV +β4 BSIZE +β5 BIND +β6 BMEET + β7 ASIZE + β8
AIND+Β9 AMEET+ β10 OWNC +ε
The researchers find that it is necessary to control for the ownership concentration
(OWNC). Hassan (2016) and Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) argued that companies with high
ownership concentration have longer ARL. In ownership concentration companies, opposite to
ownership dispersion, where small major investors own big percentages of stocks, the likelihood
to publish faster audited financial statements is low (Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018). Regarding the
measurement of variables, Table 2 displays the definition of the model variables and their
measurements based on prior studies.

Fig.1: Proposed Research Model
Source: Developed by the Researchers

5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section displays the evolution of ARL of the study sample during the six-year period (2012
– 2017), descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables, correlation, multivariate
analysis, and sensitivity analysis.

5.1 Evolution of the Audit Report Lag
The average ARL evolution of the sample banks over the six- year period (2012-2017) is
presented in Table 3 and Fig. 2. The figure shows significant increase in the average ARL for
the Lebanese commercial banks in 2016 and 2017, as compared to the previous years. Indeed,
the average ARL increased from 116 days (in 2015) to 137 days (in 2016). Although this increase
is considered a negative signal for stockholders because it decreases the quality of audit reports
(Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018), the averages of 2016 and 2017 are still within the acceptable period
for submitting the audit reports to the Lebanese central bank. As mentioned in Basic Circular No
7 published by the central bank, the Lebanese banks should submit their external audit reports
before September 30 of each year (BDL, 1982).

Independent Variables (Corporate Governance
Determinants)

Independent Variables
(Company Specific
Determinants)

Dependent
Variable

Table 2: Measurement of Variables
Variables
Audit Report Lag
(ARL)

Measures
Measured by the number of days from
the end of a bank’s fiscal year to the
date of signing the external audit report.

Previous Studies
(Ashton et al., 1987; Hussin & Bamahros,
2013; Pazzini et al., 2015; Hassan, 2016;
Oussii & Taktak, 2018a).

Company Size
(SIZE)

Measured by the natural logarithm of a
bank’s total assets.

(Ettredge et al., 2006; Afify, 2009; Abbott
et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015; Khoufi &
Khoufi, 2018; Durand, 2019; Habib et al.,
2019).
(Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif,
2017; Oussii & Taktak, 2018a &b).

Profitability
(PROF)

Measured by a bank’s ROA (net
income divided by the total assets)

leverage (LEV)

Measured by a bank’s total debts to
total assets.

Board size
(BSIZE)
Board
Independence
(BIND)
Board Meetings
(BMEET)
AC Size
(ASIZE)

Measured by a proportion of
nonexecutive directors to total number
of members in the board.
Measured by the number of board
meetings in a year
Measured by the number of AC
members.

Measured as a proportion of
independent and/or non-executive
directors to the total number of
directors included in the AC.
AC Meetings
Measured by the number of meetings
(AMEET)
held by the AC during the year.
Ownership
Measured by the percentage of capital
Concentration
held by major shareholders. The major
(OWNC)
shareholders are those who own more
than 5 % of the bank’s shares.
Source: Developed by the Researchers

Control
Variable

AC
Independence
(AIND)

Measured by the number of board
members.

(Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012;
Dao & Pham, 2014; Pizzini et al., 2015;
Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Durand, 2019).
(Ezat & El-Masry, 2008;Wu et al., 2008;
Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Hassan, 2016;
Samaha & Khlif, 2017).
(Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Akhtaruddin et
al., 2009; Nelson & Shukeri, 2011)
(Chan et al., 2016; Habib et al., 2019).
(Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Nelson &
Shukeri, 2011; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b;
Baatwah et al., 2019).
(Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Oussii &
Taktak, 2018b)

(Oussii & Taktak, 2018b; Habib et al.,
2019; Baatwah et al., 2019)
(Hassan, 2016; Oussii & Taktak, 2018b;
Baatwah et al., 2019)

Table 3: Average ARL in Days
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115.6
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Source: Developed by the Researchers
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Fig.2: Evolution of Average ARL in 2012-2017
Source: Developed by the Researchers

5.2 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the model’s variables are summarized in Table 4. It is evident
in the table that the average audit delay for the 130 bank-year observations over the six-year
period (2012-2017) is 121.6 days (standard deviation 35.299) with minimum and maximum
intervals of 51 and 273 days, respectively. Thus, the Lebanese commercial banks take in average
4 months and 3 days to be ready to publish the audited financial reports to the stakeholders. The
results reveal high variations of audit delay among the sample banks; however, all banks meet
the deadline for submitting the external audit report to the Lebanese central bank (within 273
days from the end of the bank’s year). Compared with the ARL in developing and developed
countries, the average ARL for the Lebanese commercial banks seems to be higher than the audit
lag of the listed firms in these countries. For instance, in the developing countries, Afify (2009)
reported an average ARL of 67.21 days for the Egyptian listed companies in the year 2007.
Consistently, Hassan (2016) documented an average audit lag of 62.04 days of the Palestinian
listed firms for the year 2011. In the developed countries, Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) found that
the average ARL for a sample of 50 French firms is 88 days over the period 2010-2014, within
an interval of 29 and 180 days. A probable interpretation for the difference between the mean
ARL of this study and other studies carried out in various developed and developing countries is
that this study concentrates only on the banking sector; however, the other studies were
conducted on more than one sector. For example, Afify (2009) carried out his study on a sample
of 85 Egyptian organizations from various sectors and listed in the Egyptian stock exchanges.
Khoufi and Khoufi (2018) conducted their research on a sample of 50 firms listed in Paris stock
exchange market and related to different sectors, except the banking sector. The authors
considered that the operations of the financial sector are much different from other sectors; thus,
it should be excluded from the sample.
Table 4 also provides information concerning the explanatory variables. Regarding the
board characteristics, the board size ranges from 7 to 13 board members, with a mean of 10
members. The mean number of meetings conducted by the banks’ boards is 5 meetings per year
and in average 68.86% of the boards’ members are non-executive. Concerning the AC
characteristics, the mean number of AC members of the sample banks is approximately 4, with
minimum and maximum intervals of 3 and 5 members, respectively. The mean (0.932) of the
AC independence reflects that the majority members of the ACs are independent and/or nonexecutive members. Moreover, in average the ACs conducted 4 meetings per year during the
period (2012-2017). With respect to the company specific determinants, the natural logarithm of
the sample banks’ total assets ranges from L.L. 12.86 (in millions) to L.L. 18.02 (in millions);

while ROA ranges from -1.56 to 1.99. The mean (0.9055) of the leverage reflects that total debts
represents high proportion of the sample banks’ total assets. Concerning the control variable,
ownership concentration, the proportion of stocks owned by the major stockholders ranges from
41.04 % to 99.99%; and the standard deviation of (19.296) indicates high variations among the
sample banks regarding ownership concentration.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Dependent Variable
ARL (Days)
Independent Variables
SIZE
PROF (ROA)
LEV
BSIZE
BIND
BMEET
ASIZE
AIND
AMEET
Control Variable
OWNC

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

130

51.00

273.00

121.5923

35.29954

130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130

12.86
-1.56
.79
7.00
.36
4.00
3.00
.67
3.00

18.02
1.99
.94
13.00
1.00
12.00
5.00
1.00
8.00

15.8755
.8585
.9055
9.9154
.6886
5.3538
3.5769
.9321
4.2308

1.20547
.36779
.02953
1.61406
.14822
2.07929
.66897
.11774
.84025

130

41.04

99.99

80.3171

19.29648

Note: ARL, audit report lag; SIZE, bank size; PROF, profitability; LEV, leverage; BSIZE, board size; BIND, board
independence; BMEET, board meetings; ASIZE, AC Size; AIND, AC independence; AMEET, AC meetings; OwnC,
Ownership concentration.

5.3 Correlation
As revealed in Table 5, there are significant correlations between ARL and each of the
explanatory variables at 0.01 or 0.05 significant levels, except for AC size. The correlation
coefficient value (0.526) between bank size and board size is the highest among the correlation
coefficients of the explanatory variables. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem since all the
correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are less than 0.8 (Bryman & Cramer,
2011). Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the explanatory variables, shown
in Table 6, are below 4; which provides additional evidence that there is no severe
multicollinearity trouble among the explanatory variables (Kutner et al., 2004). Moreover, the
Durbin-Watson (DW) value (2.024) shown in Table 6 reflects that there is no serious
autocorrelation problem (Durbin & Watson, 1950).
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Model Variables
ARL
SIZE
PROF
LEV BSIZE BIND BMEET ASIZE AIND AMEET OWNC
ARL
1
SIZE
-.303**
1
PROF
-.233**
.389**
1
LEV
.178*
.300**
.044
1
BSIZE
-.266**
.526**
.154
.032
1
BIND
.185*
-.037
-.052 -.203*
-.087
1
BMEET
-.252**
.038
.027
-.015
-.028
-.020
1
ASIZE
-.054
.079
.182*
-.061 .383**
.037
-.031
1
AIND
-.244**
.244**
.125
.183*
.157
.101
.154 -.227**
1
AMEET
-.488**
.215*
.214* -.196*
.112
-.049
.272**
-.197* .283**
1
OWNC
.254** -.393**
-.155
-.091 -.313**
.025
-.007
-.095
.093
-.214*
1
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

5.4 Multivariate Analysis

Table 6 displays the outcomes of the multiple regression analysis. The adjusted R2 reflects
that the explanatory variables are accounting for 36.7 % of the variance in ARL. The F- value of
8.49 (P = 0.000, less than 0.05) supports the significance of the regression model. The outcomes
show that three variables (leverage, AC meetings, board independence), one variable (AC
independence), and three variables (bank size, board meetings, ownership concentration) are
statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively in interpreting ARL of the Lebanese
commercial banks. The p-value (0.17) of AC size reflects insignificant relationship between the
variable and ARL.
The results support H1, H2b, H3c, H4b, and H4c, and reject H2a, H3a, H3b and H4a, since no
significant associations are revealed between ARL and each of profitability, board size, and AC
size. Besides, opposite to the predictions, the outcomes reveal that board independence affects
audit delay positively.
Table 6: Results of Regression Analysis
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model

Standardized
Coefficients
β

t- test

β
Std. Error
(Constant)
-1.773
96.241
-0.018
SIZE
-5.274
2.958
-.180
-1.783
PROF
-2.812
7.705
-.029
-0.365
LEV
322.902
99.411
.270
3.248
BSIZE
-0.076
2.118
-.003
-0.036
BIND
56.518
17.794
.237
3.176
BMEET
-2.227
1.251
-.131
-1.780
ASIZE
-6.243
4.521
-.118
-1.381
AIND
-63.529
25.266
-.212
-2.514
AMEET
-11.551
3.627
-.275
-3.184
OWNC
0.265
.149
.145
1.783
R2 = 0.416
Adjusted R2 = 0.367
F- value= 8.49 (Sig. = .000)
DW = 2.024
Note: *significant at 10 % level; **significant at 5 % level; ***significant at 1 % level

Sig.
(P- Value)
.985
.077*
.716
.002***
.972
.002***
.078*
.170
.013**
.002***
.077*

VIF

2.080
1.314
1.410
1.912
1.138
1.107
1.497
1.448
1.520
1.344

H1 predicts a negative association between bank size and audit delay. The results accept
this hypothesis and provide evidence that bank size (coefficient = -5.274, p =0.077) is significant
predictor for ARL at 10 percent level. The studies of each of Ettredge et al. (2006), Afify (2009),
Abbott et al. (2012), Khoufi and Khoufi (2018), and Durand (2019) confirm this result and found
that the two variables are negatively and significantly related to each other.
H2 (a) posits a negative relationship between profitability and ARL. The findings of this
study reject this hypothesis and reveal an insignificant association between profitability
(coefficient = -2.812, p = 0.716) and audit delay. This finding suggests that whether the Lebanese
bank achieves high or low ROA that would not affect the date of issuing the audit report. Thus,
the banks that achieve good (bad) performance are not interested to push the external auditors to
faster (slower) the preparation of the audit report to early (postpone) transmit the good (bad)
news to the stakeholders. This result is in line with Pizzini et al. (2015) and Oussii and Taktak
(2018a) who reported insignificant association between the two variables.
H2 (b) expects a positive association between leverage and ARL. Based on the findings
shown in Table 6, the study accepts this hypothesis and provides evidence that leverage
(coefficient =322.902, p =0.002) is significant predictor for ARL at 1 percent level; which means
that banks with higher total debts experience longer ARL. This result is line with Ettredge et al.
(2006), Abbott et al. (2012), Pizzini et al. (2015), Samaha and Khlif (2017), and Durand (2019).
H3 (a) posits that board size is significantly related to audit delay. The findings of this
study reject this hypothesis and show that board size (coefficient = -0.076, p =0.972) does not
have significant impact on the audit report signature date. Thus, whether the board includes a big
or small number of directors that would not affect the time disclosure of audit. This finding is
consistent with Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010), Nelson and Shukeri (2011), Samaha and Khlif
(2017), and Habib et al. (2019) who found a non-significant relationship between the two
variables.

H3 (b) predicts a negative association between the independence of the board and audit
lag. Opposite to the expectations, this study shows a positive significant association between
board independence (coefficient =56.518, p =0.002) and ARL. In this concern, Nelson and
Shukeri (2011), Chan et al. (2016), and Samaha and Khlif (2017) found that the two variables
are not significantly associated. However, Afify (2009), Habib et al. (2019) and Durand (2019)
showed negative and significant relationship between the two variables. Although this study
contradicts the outcomes of these studies, it is in line with Wu et al. (2008) and Mohamad-Nor
et al. (2010) who found positive and significant association between board independence and
reporting lag. The researchers agree with the justification reported by Wu et al. (2008) for this
result, the authors argued that boards with more non- executive members have more effective
monitoring role and they usually devote additional time to check and verify the firm’s accounting
and auditing issues; which would increase the ARL.
H3 (c) expects a negative relationship between board diligence and ARL. The results
accept this hypothesis and provide evidence that the frequency of board meetings (coefficient =
-2.227, p =0.078) has negative and significant influence on ARL at 10 percent level. This finding
is in line with Hashim and Rahman (2010) and Chan et al. (2016). The board would be able
through the frequent meetings conducted during the year to perform close assessment of the
financial reporting process and assure the early preparation of the audit report and the timely
publishing of the audited financial statements.
H4 (a) expects a negative association between AC size and ARL. The results do not
provide evidence for significant association between the two variables; therefore, the hypothesis
is rejected. This outcome is consistent with Oussii and Taktak (2018b) who revealed that ARL
is not significantly associated with AC size. This finding can be justified by the close size of the
sample banks’ ACs during the period (2012-2017). The ACs’ size of the 130 bank-year
observations, with different ARLs, range within limited interval from 3 to 5 members as
presented in Table 4.
H4 (b) posits that the independence of the AC is negatively related to audit lag. The
findings support this hypothesis and show that increasing the AC independence (coefficient = 63.529, p =0.013) can significantly decrease ARL. Durand (2019) confirms this result and found
that the two variables are negatively and significantly related to each other. This outcome
provides evidence that the existence of non-executive and/or independent members in the AC
enhances the internal controls over financial reporting, which would encourage the external
auditors to increase their reliance on these controls and reduce the time-consuming audit tests;
thus the ARL would decrease.
H4 (c) suggests a negative association between AC diligence and audit lag. The results
accept this hypothesis and reveal that as the number of AC meetings increases during the year
the ARL significantly decreases. This outcome is in line with Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) and
Samaha and Khlif (2017) who found that the recurrence of AC meetings is negatively and
significantly related to ARL. Through the repeated meetings, the AC would be informed about
the various financial and auditing aspects, and might be able to direct the external auditors to
issue timelier audit reports.
Regarding the control variable, the findings provide evidence that there is positive and
significant association between ownership concentration (coefficient = 0.265, p = 0.077) and
ARL at 10 percent level. This result means that the Lebanese commercial banks with few major
investors who own high percentages of stocks have longer audit delay. Although this outcome
contradicts some studies (for example, Leventis et al., 2005; Hassan, 2016; Oussii & Taktak,
2018b; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018) which found that ownership concentration is insignificantly
associated with ARL; nevertheless, all these studies posited a positive relationship between the
two variables.

5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
ARL is measured in literature either as the number of days between the end of the firm’s
fiscal year and the date of signing the audit report or as the natural logarithm of this amount
(Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Durand, 2019). Following Samaha and Khlif (2017), the researchers
performed a sensitivity test through measuring the ARL by its natural logarithm value instead of
its original value. The F- value 10.691 (P = 0.000) of the sensitivity model, presented in Table

7, supports the significance of the regression model. Moreover, the results of the robustness test
reveal no serious differences between the outcomes of the study’s primary model and the
sensitivity model. Consistent with the primary model, the results of the sensitivity test show that
ARL is significantly and negatively related to each of bank size, frequency of board meetings,
AC independence, and frequency of AC meetings; besides, the outcomes reveal that leverage
and board independence are significantly and positively associated with ARL, at level 1 percent.
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis reflects no significant association between ARL and each
of profitability, AC size, board size, and ownership concentration.
Thus, the results of the sensitivity test are consistent with the outcomes of the primary model
concerning the significance and direction of the associations between each of the explanatory
variables and ARL, except for the control variable (ownership concentration) that reveals to be
significantly associated with audit lag in the primary model but insignificant in the sensitivity
model.
Table 7: Robustness Test
Sensitivity Model (Natural Log. of
ARL)

Primary Model (ARL)
Hypotheses
(Constant)
Independent
Variables

Coefficients
(β)

t- test

Sig.
( P-value)

Coefficients
(β)

t- test

Sig.
( P-value)

-1.773

-0.018

0.985

3.483

4.861

0.000 ***

SIZE

H1 (-)

-5.274

-1.783

0.077*

-0.043

-1.972

0.051*

PROF

H2a (-)

-2.812

-0.365

0.716

-0.054

-0.947

0.346

322.902

3.248

0.002***

2.919

3.944

0.000***

-0.076

-0.036

0.972

-0.006

-0.359

0.721

LEV
BSIZE
BIND

H2b (+)
H3a (?)
H3b (-)

56.518

3.176

0.002***

0.444

3.352

0.001***

BMEET

H3c (-)

-2.227

-1.780

0.078*

-0.021

-2.214

0.029**

ASIZE

H4a (-)

-6.243

-1.381

0.17

-0.033

-0.972

0.333

AIND

H4b (-)

-63.529

-2.514

0.013**

-0.338

-1.794

0.075*

-11.551

3.184

0.002***

-0.105

-3.871

0.000 ***

0.265

1.783

0.077*

0.001

1.206

0.23

AMEET
Control
Variable
OWNC
Number of
Observations
Adjusted R2
F (P-value)
DW
Maximum
VIF

H4c (-)

130
0.367
8.49 (0.000***)
2.024
2.08

130
0.429
10.691 (0.000***)
1.923
2.08

Note: *significant at 10 % level; **significant at 5 % level; ***significant at 1 % level

6. CONCLUSION
The timeliness of financial disclosure depends definitely on the timeliness of audit reports. The
goal of this study is to investigate the company specific determinants and corporate governance
determinants of ARL in the Lebanese context, specifically in the banking sector. Using the data of 24
Lebanese commercial banks for six-year period, from 2012 to 2017, nine hypotheses were tested by
conducting a multiple regression analysis. Regarding the company specific determinants, the study
provides evidence that profitability has no significant effect on audit delay; however, bank size and
leverage appear as significant determinants of ARL. The results show that large banks are more able
to accelerate the publishing of the external audit reports; while, banks with high debts are less likely

to decrease the external audit lag. These outcomes confirm that big banks are more capable to possess
stronger internal control systems that can reduce the likelihood to have errors in the ﬁnancial
statements and enable the external auditors to depend more on those controls and faster the release of
the audit reports. In addition, the high debts would increase the doubts of the external auditor on the
quality of the financial reports because he would consider the probable existence of manipulations in
the financial reports for the sake of releasing more optimistic information to the shareholders. In this
case, the external auditor would increase the audit tests, which would delay the publishing of the audit
report.
Regarding the corporate governance determinants, the outcomes show that board diligence, AC
independence, and AC diligence decrease ARL. Through the frequent board meetings, the directors
would follow up and make close assessment to the firm’s financial and auditing situation and would
assure timely disclosure of the annual report, including the external auditor opinion. In addition,
through the frequent AC meetings, the members of the committee would be informed about the
various accounting and auditing aspects and they can push the external auditors to faster the issuing
of the audit report. Concerning AC independence, the presence of independent and non-executive AC
members would improve the internal controls over financial reporting, which would reduce the
substantive tests accomplished by the external auditors and faster the preparation of the audit report.
With respect to board independence, the results reveal that the presence of non-executive members
in the board increases ARL. For the sake of maintaining their reputation, the non-executive board
members devote more time for checking the various financial and auditing matters, which increases
the audit delay. Furthermore, the results show that each of AC size and board size have insignificant
effect on ARL. Hence, increasing the number of members in the board or in its subcommittee do not
have significant influence on the date of signing the external audit report.
Regarding the control variable, the outcomes show that high ownership concentration increases
significantly the ARL. This result confirms that the dominance of few investors who own big
percentages of stocks increases the delay of issuing the external audit reports of the banks. In
conclusion, the regression results reveal that banks with longer ARL are smaller, have higher
leverage, elect more non-executive board directors, their boards and ACs conduct less meetings, their
ACs are less independent from management, and have higher ownership concentration.
The results of this study can be beneficial for the boards, managements, and the external
auditors of the banking sector. Shedding the light on the key determinants of ARL may give insights
for those parties to take decisions or follow procedures that faster the preparation of the audit reports,
which would accelerate the publishing of the audited financial reports. For example, the outcomes of
this study may encourage the Lebanese commercial banks’ boards and their ACs to conduct more
frequent meetings during the year and increase the number of independent and non-executive
members in the ACs. In addition, the results may stimulate the regulators and policy makers in
different countries to issue laws to enhance the timeliness of audit disclosure in the banking sector.
For example, the Lebanese central bank may issue new law or circular to shorten the deadline for
submitting the banks’ external audit reports to be before September 30 of each year. Moreover, due
to the significance impact of ownership concentration on ARL, as revealed in this study, issuing a
new law that sets the maximum percentage of stocks that can be owned by each stockholder may
decrease the ARL of the Lebanese banks.
This research adds and contributes to the finite literature that investigates the influence of firm
characteristics and corporate governance factors on the ARL in the Middle East countries by focusing
on the Lebanese context, specifically on the Lebanese banking sector. Moreover, through covering
six-year period (2012-2017), this research considers the limitations of other previous studies (for
example, Afify, 2009; Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Nelson & Shukeri, 2011; Hassan, 2016) who
focused only on one year in their examinations of the determinants of ARL. Considering a long-term
interval that covers six-year period to investigate the determinants of ARL, rather than focusing on
one single year, provides more valid results and reflects the trend of ARL over the time.
However, the current study has two limitations that shed the light on future research. First, this
study considers the impact of company characteristics and corporate governance factors on ARL and
excludes the influence of audit related attributes. The literature (for example, Hajiha & Rafiee, 2011;
Dao & Pham, 2014; Pizzini et al., 2015; Samaha & Khlif, 2017; Khoufi & Khoufi, 2018; Oussii &
Taktak, 2018a; Durand, 2019) revealed that certain audit factors (such as the type of audit report,
auditor change, and the type of auditors) have significant influence on ARL. After going through the

130 bank-year observations of the 24 sample banks during the six-year period (2012-2017), the
researchers found that most of the banks’ audit reports are unqualified, few banks changed their
external auditors, and each bank appointed two external audit firms one of them is a big N audit firm.
The Basic Circular No 122 published by the Lebanese central bank in 2009 requires from the banks
working in Lebanon to appoint the external auditors for a renewable three-year period (BDL, 2009),
which would decrease the likelihood to have changes in the external auditors of these banks. In
addition, the periodic visit of the qualified external auditors of the big N audit firms to the Lebanese
commercial banks during the audit period and the continuous follow up with management to correct
the misstatements in the financial reports and the deficiencies in the internal controls decrease the
probability of having qualified audit opinions. This may justify the rarely existence of qualified audit
reports. Due to these reasons, the researchers did not consider the audit factors because they assumed
that those factors would not have significant role in interpreting the ARL of the Lebanese banks. The
second limitation of this study is that it focuses only on the banking sector and excludes the other
Lebanese sectors (e.g. insurance, manufacturing, other service sectors, etc…). The exclusion of the
other sectors is due to the difficulty of getting the annual reports of their firms, especially that most
of these companies do not publish their annual reports. In addition, these sectors have different
regulations and policies from the banking sector. Indeed, those limitations can be considered as bases
for future research.
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